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Abstract
In most Industrial and Industrializing Countries, labor markets are character-
ized by employers offering packages of wage, non-wage, and working conditions
to prospective workers. In return, workers offer to apply effort to tasks determined
by employers. This paper attempts to examine these employer-employee contracts
using a stockout avoidance model with employees providing variable labor effort.
1 Introduction
In industrial and industrializing countries, labor markets are characterized by employers offering
packages of wage and non-wage payments (in the form of fringe benefits and working conditions)
to prospective workers. In return workers offer to apply effort (which is often measured by
”hours paid for” per week) to tasks determined by the employer. However detailed, employer-
employee contracts can never be complete, in the sense that they can do no more than specify
a minimal expected product (usually expressed in terms of an approximate number of hours of
input) and some subset types and quantities of remuneration. Among other things this lack
of specificity in contracting results from the agents’ inability to specify all of the contingencies
possible in an uncertain and risky world. The lack of precision in contracting also allows for
variable performance on the part of the firm and the worker. This paper will focus on the
variability of workers’ effort and the attempts by firms to lower and accurately predict that
variability since we argue that such variability can be costly in many industries1.
More specifically we will term the worker’s contribution to output ”effort” (in lieu of the
common measure ”hours paid for”) and the firm’s payment to workers as compensation. In this
paper we argue that employers can vary the components of this compensation not only to increase
effort, but most importantly for the purposes of this work we will argue that employers alter
the composition of compensation not only to increase effort but to lower its variability because
variable effort in modern continuous process production is costly. Thus we argue that firms use
the composition of compensation to influence the variability of labor effort.
1This paper has direct and clear applications to problems in economic development, economic history, economic
organization and labor economics. Given appropriate data for example on piece rates and their variability among
workers, the hypotheses presented here are empirically testable.
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The ways in which institutional wage-performance structures have evolved so as to minimize
effort variability and increase the predictability of daily labor productivity are at least fourfold.
First, firms may hold inventories of goods at every stage of production to assure against un-
expected interruptions in the effort flow; but, such inventories are costly to maintain. Second,
firms may obtain information concerning the potential flow of effort from various sources such as
alternative forms of monitoring (e.g., direct supervision), information from past work histories,
various forms of certification, examinations, and so on. These sources of information are used to
elicit and predict the effort forthcoming from the firm’s labor force. In addition to goods inven-
torying and monitoring, incentive payments may be employed to assist in obtaining a predictable
and maximal application of effort; for example, piece rates, contests and bonuses.2
Finally, as is shown below, firms using information gained through compensation in-kind may
elicit from their work an effort flow that is less costly to forecast and has (or probably has) lower
variability than the effort flow elicited in the absence of an all-cash compensation structure. To
the extent that in-kind payments have lower costs than other forms of monitoring and incentives
and achieve equal or better outcomes firms will use them as substitutes for other information
gathering mechanisms.
In addition to assisting in effort observation and lowering the variability of the effort flow,
it is likely that firms will use payments in-kind to make human capital investments in their
workers with the goal of increasing both their productivity and effort. To the extent that the
workers’ marginal productivity is increased by these investments and to the extent that this
increase is firm specific, its costs will be shared by workers and firms. We will ignore this aspect
2We will use the terms effort variability and effort predictability as equivalent in meaning. That is, as employers
either lower variability or obtain more information concerning the variability (holding the level of variability
constant) of the effort flow, it will become predictable with a higher degree of precision.
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of compensation composition. With the exception of noting that fringe benefits (compensation
composition) is well known to be used to raise worker productiviy. For example, in developing
countries workers are often provided a meal on the job. This not only keeps them at the worksite
but provides them with nutrition which they would otherwise not receive.3
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section the problem of effort variability is presented
in a historical context. Section 4 describes the model of uncertainty concerning labor effort and
the costs of (for example) increasing inventories which lead to higher production and higher
employment and labor costs. Further the section describes workers who will respond with smaller
variability of effort to a wages plus a portfolio of goods that are positively correlated with effort.
Section 3 provides a small bit of evidence of the plausibility of this hypothesis. The final section
presents conclusions and recommendations for further exploration of this problem.
3This point regarding human capital investments has been made several times in the past. See among others:
Becker, Mincer, Owen and Olsen.
In a related area (as noted in the text) we will also disregard other aspects of in-kind compensation such as
productive consumption, whereby firms increase the mean level of effort (and productivity) of their workforces.
We will also ignore other rationales for payments in-kind, such as price advantages for in-kind payments derived
from preferential tax treatment, and economies of group purchase, as well as their payment in response to trade
union pressures, their effect of reducing costly worker turnover, and their payment in particular industries or to
particular demographic groups of workers (e.g., in-kind payments seem to be demanded by older workers). (See
Alpert (1982 and 1983).
In a related context, Hilton notes four rationales for the ”truck system” (the designation of the in-kind payments
scheme in Britain during the Industrial Revolution). The first is an increase in the firm’s ability to exercise
monopoly power and reduce wages through this contractual system. Second, the use of this system may reflect
the existence of a form of ”wage illusion” through which the firm cuts real wages by raising the prices charged
to the workers for in-kind payments (company store model). Third, payment in-kind allows the length of time
between paydays to be increased, thereby lowering the frequency of pay days. This procedure limits the capital
tied up in wage payments and allegedly makes non-wage payments, when coupled with compulsion to deal with a
company facility (e.g., by payment in script), allow employers to force workers into debt. It was argued that this
debt bound workers to the employer and also forced the heads of large households into greater debt and hence
permitted them less job mobility than other individuals.
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2 The Problem of Effort Variability and the Effort Pro-
duction Function
The importance of effort variability is most apparent during the development of modern indus-
trial economies. We can use particular examples of the import of effort variability from the
industrializations of Europe and the United States in the 19th Century as well as in modern
industrializing economies. Unlike means of earning a living in traditional societies, factory work
requires a predictable, coordinated and usually even flow of effort from the labor force. This
type of effort is contrasted with the more variable and less predictable worker effort which,
given the technology and capital of the period, did not necessarily inhibit efficient production in
pre-industrial societies.
It is assumed that each worker transforms physical inputs (food, sleep, intellectual study,
practice and so on) into effort. That effort when combined with physical capital and other
resources performs the production of output. For example the physical input food is transformed
into effort, where the quality and amount of food affect the effort flow.
(Insert Figure Here)
Knowledge about the foods (nutrition content of the foods) consumed by workers will yield
information to the firm regarding both the mean effort that employers may expect to receive from
workers as well as information regarding the variability of that effort. This paper concerns itself
with the latter phenomona. The firm could obtain knowledge about consumption patters by
directly monitoring the inputs of workers into their bodies. Or, as proposed here, the firm could
make it relatively costly for workers to consume anything other than inputs which would elicit
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a predictable flow of effort by paying compensation in-kind. More precisely, with information
obtained from the control of consumption through in-kind payments, the firm could both reduce
the variance of worker effort as well as calculate it more accurately. Thus, by manipulating
relative prices (for example through payment in-kind) the firm may control the consumption
bundle of its workforce to some extent. It could, for example, provide high quality housing
in close proximity to the workplace, nutritious food and medical care which would lower the
variability of the effort flow from labor (and probably increase its mean as well). The firm might
even choose to provide goods such as liquor, poor quality food and so on so long as the goods
were dispensed in such a way so as to make the effort flow more predictable.4
Therefore, a firm that pays in-kind will achieve higher profits ceteris paribus than a firm that
does not make such effort-predicting payments. If there are costs incurred by this procedure,
the firm will increase its payments in non-money compensation until the marginal benefits of
increasing in-kind payments are equal to the marginal costs of doing so.
The idea that firms remunerate in-kind to affect and monitor the variability of worker on-
the-job effort has intuitive appeal because workers spend substantially larger amounts of time in
non-work environments than in work environments. A 40 hour per week worker (with a one hour
lunch break and two 15 minute breaks during the day) spends only 19 percent of their weekly
time at work leaving 81 percent of their time their own. Direct monitoring of the non-work
environments is undoubtedly very costly. Payments in-kind are likely to be a relatively low cost
4Suppose, for example, the firm sells liquor only in on and one-half ounce non transportable containers , and
only between the hours of 5 p.m. Saturday and 2 a.m. Sunday. Suppose further, that this practice results in a
high (prohibitively high) relative price at other times during the week. The firm knows that under this system
up to five percent of its workers will be ill as a result of drinking on any given workday whereas, under a purely
public market distribution system for liquor the number ”out sick” due to excessive liquor consumption will vary
between zero and fifty percent. With free market distribution the average rate of absenteeism will be higher
and the higher absence rates will occur anytime the worker decides to have a party. In the firm price subsidized
environment less variation will likely occur.
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substitute for such direct monitoring of the production of potential effort by workers away from
the work place.5
While employers have often called for a smooth flow of labor effort they have rarely enunci-
ated the smoothing of work effort as one of their goals; however, evidence consistent with this
hypothesis is plentiful. For example, a well-known commentator on managers’ behavior in the
industrial revolution in Britain notes that, ”what was needed was regularity and steady intensity
in place of irregular spurts of work..” 6
Many early industrialists attempted to control as much of the non-work environment as
possible. Usually these attempts are explained as an extension of the old order’s ”paternalism,”
or some more modern version of it. Yet this conclusion may not be warranted. T. S. Ashton
notes that a unique new industrial system emerged in the early 19th Century in which new forms
of labor contracts were introduced. Ashton argues that,
The second generation of employers was perhaps more alive than the first to the
losses that might arise from irregular or carelessness on the part of labour. Men
trained in the concern were appointed as managers and foreman; piece-rates and
bonus schemes were introduced to stimulate effort; and fines were imposed for drunk-
enness, sloth and gaming. The new methods of administration, the new incentives,
and the new discipline were as much a part of the revolution as the technical innova-
tions themselves... [emphasis added]7
The most well-known attempt to lower the variance in effort and hence increase predictability,
5A historical example of a case of total environmental monitoring is that of American Slavery
6Pollard, p. 181
7Ashton, p. 85.
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examined intensively by George Hilton, is the Truck System. Hilton notes that
It was widely suggested in the nineteenth century that .... the truck system
was a sumptuary device, an effort by employers to reduce drunkenness among their
workmen.8
Company stores were not always used for the capturing of rents from workers. Often goods
were priced below retail, and it is a tenable hypothesis (awaiting significant historical data
mining) that even though average prices were probably higher in truck shops, firms followed a
policy of pricing products thought, at the time, to be substitutes for work or ”effort randomizers”
(especially liquor and other ”nonproductive” goods) at relatively high prices and price goods
thought, at the time, to be complements to work or effort stabilizers-predictors at relatively low
levels.
Additional evidence that firms attempt to stabilize workers’ effort by in-kind remuneration is
offered by Sumner Schlicter. He characterizes the effects of ”modern” personnel relations (circa
1920) in the following way:
If the worker has a toothache, the company dentist will cure it; if he has a headache
or a cold, he can get treatment from the company doctor; if he or a member of his
household needs an operation, the company doctor will help him find a competent
surgeon; in some cases the company optometrist will measure him for glasses, and
the company chiropodist will treat his corns. If he has legal difficulties, he can obtain
free advice from the company’s lawyer; if his wife or children are sick, a nurse from
the compay will isit his home to render such assistance as she can; if he wishes to
8Hilton, p. 7
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save money, the company will act as agent for a bank, deduct the money from his
paycheck, deposit it in the bank, and do the bookkeeping for him; if he needs to
borrow money, the company will lend it to him at a low rate of interest; if he wishes
to own his own home the company will build one for him and sell it to him on easy
terms... 9
The purpose of these payments clearly seems to be one of stabilizing and predicting worker
performance. Equivilent policies today might include on site day care centers and satellite charter
schools, etc.
In summary, this paper does not propose that the current or historical rationales for in-
kind compensation are unimportant. The thesis presented here is simply that by using in-kind
payments as part of compensation modern firms using continuous process production techniques
seek to predict and lower the variability of the effort flow of its labor. The firms do this so that
they may better ascertain the actual price of labor services when they are applied to a fixed
capital stock. This creates the ability on their part to earn higher profits than firms that do
not behave in such a manner. In short, we propose that by monitoring compensation, firms can
learn the variance of effort forthcoming from their workforce with greater precision. Moreover,
through payments consisting of the appropriate consumption bundle, firms can actually reduce
the variance and hence know the effort forth coming at any moment in time with greater certainty
since its variance is smaller.
9Schlicter, p. 433
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3 Some Casual Evidence
Simply stated our hypothesis is that the more technically integrated a production process the
more costly variable labor effort becomes. Therefore the more technically integrated production
processes are the more likely it is that firms will use in-kind compensation to lower the vari-
ance of the flow of effort to that production process and by doing so make that variance more
predictictable.
This suggests to us that goods producing firms are more likely to pay in-kind than are
service producing firms. According to the most recently available Bureau of Labor Statistics
research contained in Employee Benefits in Private Industry, 200010 That publication concludes
that ”Goods-producing industries had a higher incidence of coverage than service producing
industries.” This is illustrated in the table below:
Incidence of Various Types of Benefits
(Percent of Workers With Coverage)
Benefit/Sector Retirement Health Care Life Insurance Accident Insurance
Goods Producing 61 69 69 55
Service Producing 44 48 51 39
Benefit/Sector Survivor Insurance Paid Sick Leave ST Disability LT Disability
Goods Producing 55 42 45 31
Service Producing 39 57 30 24
10Available at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/home.htm.
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Benefit/Sector Paid Vacations Paid Holidays Dental Care Vision Care
Goods Producing 84 84 33 20
Service Producing 77 71 28 17
This table illustrates that workers in the goods producing sectors have higher incidence of
benefits in every category of benefits surveyed than workers in the service producing sectors. We
assert that predictability of effort is more important in the goods producing sector than in the
service sector; thus the prevelevence of non-wage compensation in the goods producing sector.
While it is clear that this simple table holds only one factor constant and many other possible
causes of differing compositions of compensation need to be considered prior to reaching any
convincing determination of the empirical validity of the hypothesis, these data are inconsistent
with the hypothesis. Therefore, even today the hypothesis that firms use the composition of
compensation to lower (or even to make more predictable) the variability of effort may have
validity.
4 The Model
4.1 Firms
Consider a firm with the following production technology.
yt = θlt (1)
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Where lt represents labor effort. Labor will distributed N
¡
l,σ2l
¢
and is perfectly observable
by the firm. However, the firm must choose labor hours before observing time t effort. Note
that for a given choice of labor, output will be distributed N
¡
l,σ2l
¢
.
The firm faces an exogenous demand, denoted dt , represented by the following AR(1) process:
dt = d+ ρdt−1 + υt (2)
υt ∼ N
¡
0,σ2υ
¢
(3)
where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. The maximum amount a firm can sell in period t is its inventory at the end
of period t− 1. denoted It−1, plus any production during period t. Let the price of output be
given by p and denote the wage by w. Given a firms acquired inventories and assuming that p is
sufficiently high,sales at time t will be given by
St = min [It−1 + yt, dt] (4)
where St denotes actual sales at time t. Profits at time t are simply pSt−wlt. The problem
facing the firm is to choose labor each period to maximize the present discounted value of profits.
Et−1
hX∞
s=t
(1 + r)s−t (pSs − wls)
i
(5)
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Subject to demand (2) , the sales constraint (4), and the transition function for inventories
It = max [It−1 + yt − dt, 0] (6)
Note that the firm must make production decisions prior to the observation of the demand
shock υt. The upshot of this dynamic programming problem is the following efficiency condition.
w = Pr {Dt ≺ It−1 + yt} (1 + r)−1w +Pr {Dt Â It−1 + yt} p (7)
The intuition behind this is simple. The left hand side represents the marginal cost of an
additional unit of output. Once produced, there are only two possible outcomes. If current
demand is less than currently available product, the the unit of output goes into inventories
which allows production (and, hence, costs) next period to be lowered by one unit. The other
possibility is a stockout. In this case, every produced unit of output is sold at the market price
p. For simplicity, let At = It−1 + θlt −E (dt) . Equation (s) can be rewritten as follows:
w = Φ
µ
At
σ2
¶
(1 + r)−1w +
µ
1− Φ
µ
At
σ2
¶¶
p (8)
Where Φ () is a standard normal cumulative distribution function and σ2 = σ2υ + σ
2
l −
2cov (v, z). From the first order condition, if c, p,w and r are constant, then At is constant as
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well. It is straightforward to show that
At = A = Φ
−1
µ
p− w
w − (1 + r)−1w
¶
σ2 (9)
Given (8), the optimal production and inventory decisions are as follows:
yt = −It−1 +E (dt) +A
It = max [It−1 + yt − dt, 0] = max [A− vt, 0] (10)
lt =
µ
1
θ
¶
(−It−1 +E (dt) +A) (11)
Therefore, as uncertainty concerning labor effort grows (σ2l increases ), average inventory
holding must increase to avoid stockouts. Higher inventory holdings implies higher production
and, hence, higher average employment. Specifically, assume that demand and effort distur-
bances are uncorrelated. Then, from (9) and (11), the change in the firm’s average per period
labor bill is
∂lw
∂ (σ2l )
=
³w
θ
´
Φ−1
µ
p− w
w − (1 + r)−1w
¶
(12)
Hence, if firms can offer a wage contract that can lowers that variability of labor hours, they
can lower their overall labor bill land, hence raise profits.
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4.2 Households
Consumers have preferences defined over random streams of consumption and leisure represented
by the expected utility function
J (s; ξ) = E0
∞X
t=0
βtU (ct, lt) (13)
β ≺ 1 (14)
U (c, l;λ) = ln (c)− φ l
1+ν
1 + ν
ν Â 0
where c represents consumption , l represents labor, β is the discount rate and E0 repre-
sents the conditional expectation based on information available at time 0. The form of the
utility function is justified by Greenwood, Rogerson, and Wright (1994) as being consistent with
household production theory. For simplicity, utility is separable in consumption and labor. The
results will not be affected qualtatively by this. The term φ represents the state of technology
in the household production sector and is distributed i.i.d. N
¡
1,σ2φ
¢
. Consumers recieve income
through wage contracts negotiated with the firm. These contracts can contain both wage and
non-wage income. For now, assume the contract simply states a connstant hourly wage.
yt = wtlt (15)
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Income can be allocated for consumption purposes or can be saved. Savings earns the real
rate of interest. Therefore, consumers face the following budget constraint.
ct + st+1 = wtlt + (1 + rt) st (16)
the household’s decision problem is to choose a contingency plan for{ct, , lt, st+1}∞t=0 that
maximizes expected lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint.
The household’s problem can be cast in the following recursive formulation. Note that to
save on notation, time subscripts have been left out. Primed variables indicate their t+1 values.
ξ represents the state of the world which will be defined later.
J (s; ξ) =Max
c,l,s0



W (c, l) + βEtJ (s
0; ξ0)
+λ (wl + (1 + r) s− c− s0)



(17)
The upshot of the dynamic programming problem are the following first order conditions
W1 (c, l) = λ (18)
−W2 (c, l) = wλ (19)
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βEJ 0 (s0; ξ0) = λ (20)
Along with the following envelope condition
J 0 (s; ξ) = λ (1 + r) (21)
Equation (18) is the efficiency condition for consumption. The multiplier λ represents the
marginal utility of wealth. Equation (19) in the first order condition for labor. Equation (20) is
the efficiency condition for savings. These conditions can be reduced to the following restrictions
on consumption and labor.
lt =
½
w
φct
¾ 1
ν
(22)
Et
½
ct
ct+1
¾
=
1
β (1 + r)
(23)
Note that a positive shock to productivity in the household sector lowers labor effort in the
production. Further, given the variabiity of household productivity, the variability of labor effort
will be a negative function of ν which is a measure of the concavity of household production.
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σ2l = Ω
¡
σ2l , ν
¢
Ω1 (.) Â 0
Ω1 (.) ≺ 0 (24)
4.3 Non-Wage Benefits and Effort Variability
Suppose that the firm wrote labor contracts that included non wage benefits as well as a con-
tracted wage rate. Specifically, suppose that the firm offered a contract that specified a fixed
wage plus a portfolio of assets with random payouts that were positively correlated with a workers
household productivity. Specifically,
w = ew + π (φ) (25)
π0 Â 0, π (1) = 0 (26)
Note that this has no effect on the firm’s wage commitment per hour, but it will lower the
firm’s wage bill (and, hence, profitibility) by lowering the the variability of labor effort. Recall
that by lowering labor effort variability, the firm can lower its variability of output. Therefore,
less inventories are required to avoid stockouts which lowers average production. If fact, choosing
the correct structure of the contract could in principle lower the variability of labor effort to zero.
The question remains, however, if the household would be willing to accept the contract. The
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answer here should also, in general, be yes. Note that utility is concave. Therefore, we know
that
E [U (x)] ≺ U [E (x)] (27)
Therefore, a contract that insures the worker against productivity shocks would lower the
variability of labor and consumption and, hence, raise expected lifetime utility.
5 Conclusions and Recommendations
Since the dawn of the industrial age commentators have continually alluded to the need for
continuous process manufacturing industrial employers to stabilize or at least to predict the
flow of labor effort. This paper argues from the historical and casual empirical evidence this a
possible way of lowering the variability of effort is employers altering the mix of compensation
between money and a variety of commodities that not only help to increase effort, but also help
to lower its variability. We use a stock out model of inventories to show that this conclusion is
theoretically reasonable. Prior to full acceptance of the hypothesis much empirical work needs
to be undertaken. For example, we might examine firms in which the predictability of effort flow
is important and those in which intermittent effort flow is inconsequential and determine the
composition of compensation in each with the expectation that effort predictors would form a
higher proportion of compensation in the firms demanding a smooth effort flow. We also might
look at prices in company stores to determine whether or not firms owning company stores
19
priced the substitutes to work effort relatively higher than the complements to work effort.
Therefore this paper is simply a first step in solving what we believe to be an intriguing issue in
compensation composition.
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